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TOWARDS REFORM OF LAND ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK  
IN INDIA 
 






We bring out the fundamental and more important problems with the current framework 
of land acquisition in India, regulations on land and the functioning of land markets. We 
argue that reform is overdue and the current framework would be unsustainable in a 
democracy that is India. Current land prices are highly distorted owing largely to 
regulatory constraints and the process of takings. Land acquisition more than any other 
factor is the most important constraint on development and especially in infrastructure 
development. We bring out the core elements of the reform – the need to define “public 
purpose” ex-ante for compulsory acquisition of land, the measures that would allow the 
market price of land to play its correct role, and the approach to valuation. We also 
argue for an independent valuer when compulsory taking is involved and methods of 
valuation to ensure that the land owner including the farmer gets the correct value for 
this land in both compulsory acquisition and in voluntary sale. We also argue the need 
for a  parallel non-compulsory framework for acquisition and develop the key elements of 
the same.  We also bring out alternatives to physical acquisition of land especially in the 
context of infrastructure development in central  places. 
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THE PROBLEM TODAY 
 
Uncertainties, risks, delays related to land acquisition, protests and resistance on the part 
of the displaced have become the most important bottleneck for investments especially in 
the infrastructure sector. 
2 Land acquisition and rehabilitation have been issues around 
which much mobilisation and protest against the state has taken place in India and 
continue to do so. Indeed environmental protest that has a mass following also have their 
roots in the problems of land acquisition and rehabilitation. Thus if the problems arising 
out of land acquisition, rehabilitation and environment (especially environmental protest) 
are considered together then they account for the overwhelming  cause of delays, cost 
overruns and high risks in projects today.  
 
Typically people whose lands and habitations are taken over by the Indian state suffer 
much and their protests while ineffective result  in much social loss and evokes the 
sympathy of the intelligentsia so much so  that a significant anti-development orientation 
among people, especially the intelligentsia and (Non-Government Organisations) NGOs 
builds up. Such “anti-developmentalisation” has taken deep roots and has lead to 
significant support for externally arising post-modernist influences in Indian society. The 
situation today is such that almost no large project which has the potential to bring 
significant gains is possible without hurting the displaced and those whose lands are taken 
over, most of whom are poor.  Development today is seen as being  “anti-poor” in a direct 
easily recognised sort of way. Even if many other poor (usually in much larger numbers) 
gain out of developmental projects, the political basis for anti-developmentalism is large. 
In other words development projects in India violate the core principle of having to be at 
least pareto-optimal – i.e. not hurting some people while leading to income rises  in many 
others.  Without basic change in the law and the policy that makes land acquisition and 
rehabilitation at least pareto-optimal if not significantly better for those giving up land 
and being displaced, it is a forgone conclusion that growth and development would have 
to adjust downwards and most of the projects would continue to suffer delays and cost 
overruns while imposing much pain on the poor, or would not be taken up. [Morris, S., 
2001] 
 
While many scholars have brought out the inequities and violation of human rights  in the 
land  acquisition process
3, there has been little attempt to understand its working either in 
economic and legal  terms, or to find solutions. The discussion has either been around of 
the limitations of the working of the governmental machinery  which have brought out 
delays in land acquisition, or in terms of the “oppressive character” of the modern 
capitalist state. This paper for the first time understands the problems of land acquisition 





  Page No. 3  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
                                                 
2 If the recent spate of protests around land in Bengal, Orissa, Kerala, UP, and Maharashtra is 
indicative then a step up in such activities is inevitable.  
3 Cf.Fernandes, W. (1998) or PUCL(1989).  
  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 








Land markets are not very close to being perfect. There are significant perversities in  
land markets, but the markets can be coaxed into delivering optimal results with 
appropriate restraints and regulation. The first insight is to recognise that no two pieces of 
land are the same (unlike in the case of most produced goods and services). But there is 
sufficient substitutability between lands, for most purposes, to allow a market to function 
and to deliver close to optimal results in most cases except when infrastructural services 
and exploitation of natural resources are involved.  It is the exception that requires 
significant attention on the part of the state and policy.   
 
The Hold-Out Problem 
One of the important problems recognised with regard to the functioning of land markets 
especially in urban areas is the “hold-out” problem which economists recognise as one 
reason for the state to intervene in some manner. Imagine that a stretch of land currently 
occupied by individual houses, is being considered by a developer to build upon a mall or 
a shopping complex. Then the project to convert the houses to a mall is socially beneficial 
if the income emerging out of the new activity on the land is large enough to cover 
current values of the plots individually and transaction costs of so converting, the 
deadweight loss of the houses having to be demolished to make way for the mall, and to 
still leave a significant surplus.  
 
The hold out problem provides one line of justification for the use of eminent domain or 
compulsory acquisition of land. Under eminent domain the state takes over the lands and 
hands them over to the new owner for the  socially beneficial activity. While the “hold-
out” problem in this case could seem to justify the use of eminent domain, in reality there 
are ways to minimise hold outs. If in this case the law prohibits developers from offering 
differential prices for  the base land, and ensures that all land owners are paid at the 
highest offered price, then potential ‘hold-out’ candidates know that they cannot coax 
large portions of the surplus out of the developer. Also they are forced to bargain 
collectively. Since the buyer has choices in other locations requiring similar aggregation, 
and groups of sellers have choices in many developers, the market would overcome the 
hold-out problem to a large extent, when subject to the regulation that every seller would 
get the maximum offered to any particular seller among the set of plots that were 
aggregated. There are of course details of defining aggregation, plots and sellers.
4 that 
would have to be worked out put in place for such a framework. 
 
Eminent Domain and Public Purpose 
Another, perhaps the really important justification for eminent domain or compulsory 
takings, has arisen out of the notion of public purpose. Strangely the public purpose has 
not generally been adequately or clearly defined. The idea here is that if the public benefit 
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is enhanced significantly then the state has the right to overcome hurdles including 
obtaining land for achievement of the same. If public purpose is understood merely as 
enhancing the total net social benefit then virtually  all socially viable projects justify the 
intervention of the state if there are barriers arising out of land to their achievement. Net 
social benefit per se does not justify ‘public purpose’ warranting the use of eminent 
domain. It  would be correct to take the view that the compulsory acquisition  by the state 
is justified only if in the realisation of a socially viable project specific land is required. 
The emphasis is on the word specific. In other words, it would be more appropriate to say 
that the specificity of land required for the attainment of public benefit justifies state 
takings or intervention. 
 
The above two aspects in the use of land has lead to laws in democracies allowing for 
eminent domain (US) or compulsory takings (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand) in 
democracies. In all such cases the purpose in a particular taking can be challenged by 
interested parties to be settled in a court of law. That provision has allowed state action 
arising out the use of eminent domain from violating systematically the rights of citizens 





                                                 
 
 
5 The recent Kelo versus the state in which the Supreme Court of the US ruled that private profit 
arising out the use of the land compulsorily taken over does not negate public purpose has created 
much uncertainty and to significant loss of the right to private property. Insightful commentators 
have claimed that the public purpose (railroads, ports, roads, dams and city improvements via due 
process) alone as was the case in the past should have merited application of eminent domain. Cf. 
Summers, Adam (2006). For a different view that the case was in keeping with the past practise 
and did not extend the domain of the state beyond a justifiable public purpose Cf. Echeverria, 
John D (2005). 
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THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
 
In India high population density and the age of its civilisation implies that it is very 
difficult to obtain land without displacing people in large numbers, or having to worry 
about loss of heritage sites. 
 
Agricultural Dependence and Surplus Labour 
Even today the marginal product of labour in agriculture is close to zero, so that many 
farms (especially of peasants and share croppers) are loss making if the total family 
labour is valued at marginal market rates in the busy season for similar labour. Much of 
household industry and service activities like rickshaw pulling can be considered as value 
added maximising rather than profit maximising. This means that if a capitalist calculus 
were to be used many farms would be loss making
6. Nevertheless  they are highly 
efficient in the social sense since the surplus labour allows them to use more labour than 
capitalist farms maximising profits alone would do. They are best considered as value 
added maximising farms. The increased labour application results in yields per unit of 
land being generally higher than on capitalist farms ceterius paribus if such a comparison 
could be made. And socially this is desirable since land is the limiting factor and labour 
the surplus factor.  
 
While in situations without disguised unemployment it would be right to value land at the 
net present value (NPV) of the rental yield of land, (or even the NPV (capitalisation) of 
the profits + rents arising out of land)  when land is the limiting factor and labour is in 
surplus i.e. the capitalisation of the value added is the correct social value or price of land. 
This would mean that compensation would have to be much higher than is generally 
admitted. The market value of land in densely populated economies (when there is a 
flourishing trade in land and especially in lease markets) incorporates such higher values 
to a partial extent. Disguised employment also means that the people displaced by a 
project even when they are not landowners nor working directly upon the land, cannot be 
assumed to be able to find alternative employment. Compensation would have to be 
income protecting (and enhancing) rather than merely covering the cost of adjustment 




                                                 
 
 
6 Imputed profit would be he revenues less the cost of inputs and that of labour including that 
which has to be imputed, cost of capital, and rents on land at market rates, which is the reward for 
risk taking in a capitalist calculus. 
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High Transaction Costs 
The land trade in India is highly taxed with transaction taxes being as high as 14.5% in 
many states
7. This would limit the trade in land and deals would  be underreported in 
value to avoid payment of taxes at such high rates
8. The annual transactions value  to the 
total stock of land would be very small,  thinning out the market, and interfering with the 
process of price discovery. Liquidity in the land market would be very low and the land 
mortgage market would operate only at a large discount
9. Reverse mortgage in land 
would be all but absent.  
 
Income taxes too affect the recorded price of land
10. The variability in land prices is large 
and the large risks in land as an asset means that the gains in land deals are an 
overestimate of the true gains out of the business of land trading, because the risk 
adjusted return would be much smaller. But income taxes do not adjust for risk since 
losses in land deals are not feasibly written off against profits unless land deals occur as 
part of a company’s business, and this is rarely the case. For neutrality with other assets it 
would be necessary to treat profits arising out of land purchase and sales as capital gains 
with low capital gains tax. When land prices have been generally moving upwards, the 
tendency to under record the price in sales would be greater. 
 
Adverse Selection 
The above problems  almost entirely displace the small investor from taking positions in 
the land market with the intention to profit. He would buy or sell land out of need and not 
to hold it as a pure asset. This is because he would find it difficult to deal with mere 
‘agreements to sell or to buy’ which larger players could hold to short circuit two 
transactions into one and reduce the transactions cost thereby. One of the important 
reasons for “mafias” in the land business is their ability to make such arguments. Another 
is that the regulatory arbitrage in land trade is stupendously large as we will bring out 
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12.5 per cent in Haryana, India has perhaps one of the highest levels of stamp duty. Some states 
even have double stamp incidence, first on land and then on its development. In contrast the 
maximum rate levied in most developed markets whether in Singapore or Europe is in the range 
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rate of 2-3 per cent. Most of the methods to avoid registration are basically to avoid payment of 
high stamp duty”.(http://www.indianground.com/legal.aspx) 
8 Indeed  in response to such high transaction taxes, a method of avoiding taxes had developed in 
Andhra Pradesh, for instance. Two parties involved a land transaction would make an agreement 
to sell, for a consideration. Then a `dispute’ would be presented in a local court, and the court 
would decree the ownership of the land to which the parties would agree. Since now the 
ownership is based on a court decree, no taxes needed to be paid! 
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trough of real estate cycles that  the perversities  and inefficiency in transactions is revealed. 
10 Other distortions arise from the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976, Rent Control 
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soon. Modest taxes would have allowed many more including small players to actively 
participate in the land market.  In such circumstances the recorded value of land would be 
a gross underestimate of the true value of land.  The compounding effect of this factor 
and the fact of disguised unemployment referred to earlier is for the recorded price to be 
considerably lower than the true value of the land to the current cultivator. 
 
Poor Record of Property Protection 
Another depressant of the market price of land arises out of the  poorer protection of 
landed property. There is considerable variation in the protection actually realised with 
regard to landed property across the country. There is much lacunae in the protection 
accorded to landed property arising both out of the law and its practice.
11 There is almost 
no person who does not know of a close relative who was cheated out his /her land due to 
illegal /forcible occupation,  or lack of clear title at the time of purchase. Indeed land in 
the urban fringes  today, even when plotted, is most difficult to hold on to unless the land 
is in occupation by the owner or his agent. That makes most middle class people buy flats 
rather than land to make investments in real estate even if that results in unoccupied 
houses and flats, or in renting out of flats at very low returns.  
 
Problems of Title 
A related important depressant of land prices in relation to value is the lack of clarity to 
any title on the land unless the land is obtained from the state. Technically any purchaser 
of landed property takes a large risk since problems with the title are on his account even 
though he may not have been aware of such problems despite his best efforts and due 
diligence at the time of purchase.  This arises because the land records that are relevant in 
determining the title can go indefinitely backwards, and there is no option to a private 
person to “commutate possible objections to the title” by appropriate legal action and 
notification. Thus a holder of land cannot register his land with a particular notified 
authority with the intention of commutating possible objections to his title through 
announcement and through due legal process carry out the same to establish his title with 
near absolute clarity. Since this facility is not there, there  is always a risk that a seller 
does nor have clear unencumbered title to the land. This puts a downward pressure on the 
price of land in relation to its true value since the “risk of title” is high in India
12. The lack 
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even by owners was a nightmare in most large cities. The one sided rent control acts had in an 
earlier period all but killed the market for rented housing. It also resulted in high risk being 
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12 Thus “India's property title system and market practices present considerable difficulties in 
establishing clean title to property. The deeds registration system is not guaranteed by the State 
and is inconclusive; typically leaving buyers with 30 years of title deeds to assess. Customary 
rights and community property rules differ by religion and location and present a myriad of 
complications. Anecdotal evidence from legal advisors indicates that the level of fraud in Indian 
real estate transactions is very significant; and the court system is notoriously slow”. 
(http://www.firstam.com.hk/newsletter/fam-e-news0206_2.htm ) in  a report that added India to 
the list of countries where First American was willing to insure against title risk. 
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REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND LAND VALUES 
 
In land more than in other businesses the value and hence the price is affected in many 
ways by regulatory restraint and control over use. It is only now that estimates of these 
are being made by valuers and the impacts are stupendous by even the most conservative 
estimates. Typical regulations include besides zoning, land use restrictions, imposed 
densities and building bye-laws.  Most of these arise in the urban context and to some 
extent are “inevitable” if urban planning has to take place to overcome the large negative 
externalities and value loss than can result from haphazard and unconstrained land use: 
While zoning in a way that is not too orthogonal to the market would enhance values, 
most of the density restrictions as also the density enhancements may  on a net basis be 
subtracting values unless they result in greater use of public transport. In India severely 
restrictive low densities (floor space indices)  have been imposed at very large social 
costs, which include inter alia making low cost public transport unviable.  
 
 
NAC Value and Prices 
In India perhaps the biggest depressionary factor on agricultural land arises out the 
restrictions (ban) on use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. “Non-
Agricultural Use Clearance”  (NAC) from the local /state government is necessary before 
land can be considered for other use.  Consider for instance the land of an area (A) which 
could potentially have been put to use in non-agriculture say for urban housing and 
related activities.  It is convenient to think in terms of annulus around the periphery of 
city of built up area B.  See Figure 1. 
 
Now if B is entirely built up and A is entirely agricultural currently, the value of  a unit of 
land in A (V )is the rental yield (or value added yield) of the land in agriculture (Ra ) +  
the probability of the land being used in non-agriculture (P)· the rental value of the land 
in non-agricultural use (Rna ). Now P is a function of the growth rate of the urban area 
and Rna  is typically many times usually 10-20 times higher than Ra .  Thus for an annulus 
like B in the immediate periphery of the built up area P is large (say 0.3) anywhere in A 
so that the larger value arises out of the second factor. So if Ra is 1 and Rna is 15 then V is 
1 +0.3·12 = 5.  Now if there is a compulsory taking of a portion of the land a1 then its 
value at market price would be close to 5 (pre taking price), and post taking the value 
would only rise by the amount of value creation due to infrastructure provision and 
zoning etc, assuming that these are functional and only such as to eliminate negative 
externalities while enhancing values otherwise. There is what is usual in most countries 
since there is usually no `blanket’ restriction or ban. 
 
Now consider the situation created by the need for NAC as in India. Pre taking since there 
is a requirement of NAC the probability P is close to zero. This is so if the grant of NAC 
is conditional on taking or linked to taking of parts of the area in question or in having to 
show proposals for non-agricultural use.  Therefore the pre-taking price is just a little 
above 1.  Now post taking the price would be 1+1·12 which is now 13, even neglecting 
the value creation aspect due to aggregation and infrastructure provision. [The P is one 
since areas like a2  and a3  in this round are denied uses beyond the agricultural]. This is 
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the price that post taking of a1 the owners of a12, a13 etc would see if they got the NAC 
along with the taking of a1. The new owner of property in a1 would see price of 13 + the 
value creation. This we may call the “regulatory arbitrage” arising out the government 
bundling the decision of NAC with taking, and not generally granting NAC otherwise.  
 
Requirement of NAC and Regulatory Taking 
NAC is not normally granted to a farmer who wants to continue to use the land for 
agriculture while looking for a buyer. NAC is given (when no taking is involved) 
typically only to the owner who comes up with a concrete proposal for putting the 
agricultural land to use in non-agriculture. Therefore, the farmer cannot benefit out of the 
value accretion that arises out of the probability of its use in non-agriculture even when 
no taking is involved. The requirement of NAC therefore bestows large rents to the 
purchaser of agricultural land at the cost of the agriculturalist who normally cannot look 
to getting NAC for his land. This creates therefore the large difference between the seller 
price and post sale price of land. [There is some moderation to the extent that the farmer 
is able to bargain in part of the price difference, anticipating the use for non-agriculture 
by the buyer when no talking is involved. When taking is involved the new owner pockets 
the value of aggregation, the jump up in prices on account of non-agricultural use being 
now possible and the associated price depression (regulatory arbitrage), entirely].  
 
These pure transfers are a major distortion of the regulation of NAC and is against the 
interest of the farmer. It amounts to state mediated transfer to the buyer from what were 
legitimately the farmer’s even when no talking is involved. This feature of Indian 
regulation more than anything else  depresses the price of agricultural land from true 
values and creates a vast difference between post and pre-change over prices. Equally 
importantly it creates a major distortion in the investment decision related to the project.  
Typically since the entrepreneur/investor in the project seeks to maximise the total return 
to the project, in this case of a significantly large transfer he would be maximising the 
earnings from the project proper plus the transfer of value on account of the land 
especially if the land is acquired through compulsory taking. 
 
Since in NPV terms the transfer could be quite significant in relation to the total value of 
the project, inappropriate choice of the project could be made. Sub optimal project choice 
is the result, as also the acquisition of excess land leading to social inefficiency. In the 
recent SEZ investments the arbitrage of regulation on land and its use is one of the 
important reasons for ‘entrepreneurial’ interest in SEZs. Projects based on compulsory 
acquisition typically acquire excess land that remains unutilised for years – public sector 
units, educational institutions universities, other institutions have all exhibited this 
phenomenon. The (perverse) incentives to do so are obvious given the vast difference in 
the price pre and post acquisition. Equally importantly when the land cost is not 
endogenous to the budget of the project as a whole, there is a tendency to ask for excess 
land especially on the part of PSUs and autonomous institutions. Indeed in the case of 




Another factor that depresses the price of agricultural land is the ban on purchase of 
agricultural land by people other than farmers, that obtains in some states including 
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Maharashtra and Gujarat
13. This does not allow the higher prices that buyers other than 
traditional farmers could have paid for the land. Lands used as orchards, farm land near 
tourist locations, scenic land, lands suitable for farming and habitation by middle and 
upper middle classes, farm lands with easy access to central places and areas with much 
potential for gentlemen farming or corporate farming are so affected. It also leads to 
much under investment in land for farming and for dual use of land. The urban rural 
divide is accentuated by such restrictions, and clearly the farmers are most hurt by these 
restrictions, and builders and other land developers with connections with the decision 
making authorities are the gainers. Most importantly the social losses are large since the 
price of land  is unable to play the role that it must –  allocating land among its many uses 
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PERVERSITIES IN COMPULSORY ACQUISITION IN INDIA 
 
Today
14 the government typically goes by market prices as recorded which as mentioned 
before is deeply depressed for various reasons including the regulatory restrictions in land 
use and purchase, the most important of which is the requirement of non-agricultural use 
which is given typically with the taking on aggregation by a developer.  
 
Unfair Process of Valuation 
Unlike in other countries that practice compulsory takings, in India the “fair value” is 
typically decided by the taker (government) itself. This is akin to  “I cut the cake and 
chose the piece too”, which is clearly unfair to the person whose land is being taken. In 
some countries notably Thailand the valuation is determined by independent licensed 
valuers and in other countries the valuation can be determined by both parties to result in 
convergence. Since against the use of the eminent domain there ought to be safeguards to 
ensure a fair valuation this combination of the taking and valuation roles is a perversity 
that is antithetical to democracy. It is the survival of the practice of an imperial 
government that did not see its interest to lie in the country or its people. Indeed it is 
typically the collector who values both the land and identifies the land for take over, not 
that it would have made a difference if different departments within the government dealt 
with the two aspects. The taking of excessive land, undervaluation, ignoring principles 
other than the one officially specified in valuation,
15 ignoring idiosyncratic value of the 
land, working with one shoe fits all principle, ignoring the particular importance of land 
in a land scarce labour surplus economy are all not merely possible, but  very much part 
of the practice today. And these interalia arise because government is both the authority 
that decides the takeover and the valuer. Indeed the discipline of valuation of land and 
real estate is poorly developed in India since the most important land related decisions 
and valuations were internal to the government
16. And equally importantly,  since the 
regulatory overload on the land market is large – NAC, restrictions in land use, 
restrictions on who can buy etc- the market aspect of valuation is poorly developed and so 
also is the discipline. Even with the best of practice, with compulsory takings, the 
tendency of the government to implicitly transfer rents to the project at the cost of 
landowners by prior regulatory taking cannot be excluded. Even in the US, rarely though, 
this has happened. That is now widely recognised in the debate on ‘fair value’ 
determination. In India the prior depression of the land value and price being taken over is 
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14 Before the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act 1885, the government decided upon 
the price without reference to the market. This had inter alia resulted in lands being acquired at 
throw away prices in the periphery of cities! 
15 Currently these go by recorded “market” prices. Even this `constraint’ on the valuer is a recent 
phenomenon – post the 1984 amendment. Before the amendment, the collector was free of any 
constraint in valuation. 
16 Interestingly there is  not even a single business school that has courses in real estate, land 
development or valuation. Not surprisingly so since there was little demand with the 
underdevelopment of the sector and the poor development of the land market. This would of 
course change as the real estate markets in the suburbs open up based on construction for the 
middle and upper middle classes. 
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the norm enshrined in the law and practice, and its non-recognition as such is very much a 
result of the government being both the taker and the valuer. 
 
Natural Resources and Valuation 
There are further inequities  in the price given to land holders in compulsory takings. 
Consider for the moment that semi arid land producing at best one crop is being taken 
over. The approach of the government is to fix a price based on the recorded price of the  
base land and to then cover the cost of assets on the land such as a house a well or a tree 
based on detailed survey and assessment. The natural resource tied to the land is not 
typically valued. Imagine that in this semi arid area there are a few scattered pockets of 
land typically no larger than a few hectares that overlie underground aquifers. 
Government covers the cost of the well, but not the resource (ground water) which given 
its scarcity and rarity in this area is of very large value.   Indeed since the area is land 
abundant the value of the land with such an aquifer above the base land would be greater 
by many times
17. In such a situation the bulk of the people would be “willing” to give up 
the land (especially when far from urban areas. This is so, because in such areas, the land 
values may have remained stagnant, and barring stamp duty there are no other incentives 
to record law prices. So a solatium of 30% above recorded prices may take the land 
values closer to the “true” values. But those occupying lands with aquifers would strongly 
resist takings. Clearly then going by reference to the market prices of base land in this 
case is not adequate but the government needs to go by the market price of the endowed 
land
18 or provide due allowance for natural resources like water.   
 
 
Intangibles Not Fully Recognised 
Intangible assets and resources like nearness to markets and central places to roads and 
highways, to railway stations and other public facilities would have to be explicitly 
recognised when the valuation is on a price for “base” land. The valuation models for true 
assessment of the same even in the best of cases when land markets are allowed and 
encouraged to function are difficult and require professional skills.  In the Indian situation 
where the land market is highly distorted and depressed, in the pre-taking stage it would 
be even more so. Most importantly in compulsory takings even after all distortions in 
price formation are overcome, the case of higher of the values arising out of multiple 
valuation models need to be considered for award. 
 
Capitalisation of Value Added for Compensation 
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We have already mentioned that in most parts of India land is the limiting factor (both in 
the static and dynamic sense, while capital is limiting only in the static sense), and labour 
is in surplus so that the agricultural value of the land goes beyond the capitalisation of the 
rental value of land in agriculture and is closer to the capitalisation of the value added in 
land. In such situation of disguised unemployment many more people than who give up 
their land are adversely affected in any large scale taking. People in the interstices of the 
economy based on land, people like rickshaw pullers, potters, menial labourers, domestic 
servants are also displaced when entire villages or substantial parts of the village are 
taken over and would have to be resettled. This aspect is not explicitly recognised in the 
 
17 In the Positra area of Gujarat where the government was planning to acquire land for an early 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), the price of such lands endowed with water over others dependent 
entirely on rain fed cultivation was more than 5 times. 
18 Assuming that other distortions such as requirement of NAC and other unnecessary regulations 
are not there. 
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LAA and the rehabilitation policy of the state. The resettlement and rehabilitation even 
when finally such people are covered comes after much negotiation and contest and more 
often as an accommodation rather than as a right of the people displaced. 
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PUBLIC PURPOSE AND COMPULSORY ACQUISITION 
 
Any Purpose as Public Purpose 
The public purpose in compulsory takings in India today is in effect any purpose the 
government of the day chooses to use the land for. At least in the British days when the 
public purpose was also not defined it was constrained by  ownership which could only 
be government or its parastatals for lands being taken ove under eminent domain. Since 
the amendment of the Act in 1984, the constraint that government owns the land post 
acquisition has gone with the incorporation of the “company” in the act.  Since the act of 
acquisition cannot be normally challenged (only the compensation provided can be 
debated)  there is no recourse from  the government of the day choosing to interpret 
“public purpose” in an all encompassing manner  that includes every possible economic 
and non-economic activity. In all other societies that the author is aware of where there is 
compulsory taking the purpose can be challenged in a court of law. In India the only basis 
to challenge acquisition post the act is the inconsistency between the stated purpose and 
the actual use to which the land has been put to. 
 
Dysfunctional Ownership Limitation 
Before the amendment to the LAA there was at least one constraint on the government 
and it was that the land taken over would be owned by the government. In the pre-
independence period this constraint was meaningful becasue  much of the land required 
for commercial activities was outside compulsory acquisition, since the government 
limited itself to governance functions, town planning and infrastructure. In the post 
independence period, since the government entered into many areas including 
commercial activities like trade and manufacturing the scope of compulsory acquisitions 
increased greatly. Furthermore  the greater pace of growth, and the deep diversification of 
the economy that took place under planning greatly increased compulsory acquisitions 
and the inequities and hurt that was imposed on Indians could only have increased 
dramatically since the government was not even constrained to pay “market rates”
19.   
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Since amendment to the LAA in compulsory acquisitions in 1984 the discretionary power 
of the government has gone up in several ways: The period from announcement of intent 
to acquire to possession has been shortened. And most importantly government can 
acquire land for companies – i.e. even if the land is to be owned and used by private 
companies or any party for that matter. But since the public purpose is not defined in any 
case, this has opened the door wide for government to acquire land for many reasons. 
Thus lands have been acquired for housing colonies, ashrams, manufacturing enterprises, 
entertainment establishments, service industries etc. Indeed the working framework is one 
where all large investors bank upon government to acquire land for them. The 
considerable transfers that this results in, both on account of excess land being asked for 
and acquired, and because of the vast depression in prices due to prior regulatory 
restraints
20 are very large
21. Today such inequity portends to create large-scale protests 
and dissatisfaction and make an otherwise democratic state system oppressive.   
 
19 It is estimated that over 50m people may have been displaced and only inadequately 
compensated or rehabilitated in this period. 
20 When significant such restraints have been called “regulatory takings” in many other 
democracies  and when so ruled have forced governments to award fair compensation. 
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Public Purpose Requires Definition 
The law needs to define public purpose and it is possible to do so with a fair degree of 
coherence. Such prior definition (and the delimitation that comes with it) would reduce 
the policy and regulatory risk associated with land acquisition and hence in investments 
in general. The alternative to leave the public purpose undefined but to allow challenge in 
a court of law while better (fairer to the land owner) than is the case in India (where the 
“public” purpose cannot be challenged) would nevertheless not lead to a substantial 
reduction in the risk. In the US a framework that does not attempt to define public 
purpose but allows challenge in a court of law has created much avoidable litigation 
around the law despite the large role of practice and precedent in the determination of the 
law. In India the costs of leaving the public purpose undefined would be even more 
severe. Given that Indian courts can be easily gamed, and they are already overburdened 
with cases, to not define the public purpose would be tantamount to swinging from one 
extreme – unfairness to the land owner to another – unfairness to the investor or project 
promoter; and with no reduction in the risk.  Although in no country has the public 
purpose been defined in the law they  have been allowed to develop especially when tort 
law and the practice has tended to inform current decisions and rulings. As such in these 
countries – US, UK, New Zealand there is fair understanding of what would pass muster 
as public purpose.  
 
Public Ownership is Not Public Purpose 
Defining public purpose in terms of ownership is not the right thing to do
22. If private 
businesses are to provide public services and increasingly so in the future, public 
ownership of the land as constituting public purpose would not be useful. It would be 
absurd to not allow a private BOT or annuity operator to not have recourse to eminent 
domain to acquire land for a dam or a road while the state is free to do so
23.  
 
Requirement of Specific Land is Crucial 
Public purpose has to be just that and an economic consideration of public services 
illuminates the problem. Thus all projects that require specific land (dam site, deep water 
site for port, and road expansion where the land required is adjacent to the existing road, a 
bridge site, flyovers and elevated highway, rail right of way) would, because alternate 
lands are quite unsuitable, be subject to market failure in their land dependence. Hence 
there is meaning in lands for such purposes being acquired under eminent domain. 
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21 Today as the economy has been considerably liberalised, governmental discretion over land and 
its use - land awards and grants, use clearances and pricing of land have become the source of 
much rent. This discretion which has given government much power to reward and punish 
bypasses all approval of the legislature. 
22 Even in a situation when all public services are provided by the state, ownership of land by the 
state is not a sufficient condition, since public services provision  would only be a subset of the 
actions possible to the state. 
23 The state acquiring, and owning the land but holding it on lease to the private party introduces 
other risks and opens the whole question of the lease value. In the actual determination  of the 
lease values much scope for transfers and “rents” would exist and the government of the day can a 
priori impose large risks on projects. This would make all projects including pure manufacturing 
projects where there is no market failure into high-risk projects with the risk emanating from the 
exposure of the party to land lease risks. Besides the price of the lease the risk emanating from 
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Similarly in the case of minerals and other natural resources specific land would be 
required. Protection of nature (actions such as creating biosphere reserves and nature 
parks, wild life preserves) and of heritage would require lands to be taken over. And 
sometimes lands even when not taken over to be subject to regulatory restraint (non-use 
in activities that are injurious to the protection of nature and of heritage) necessitating use 
of eminent domain. Much the same can be said about protection and preservation of 
homelands for tribals and such other peoples of a culture and level of development that 
warrant such protection. 
 
Physical Networks 
The issues of whether specific land is involved in highway/railway construction,  and the 
identification of the same becomes important. Conceptually for any new alignment the 
requirement of lowest cost (of construction and operations of traffic, of displacement) and 
the need to connect up so many central places on the way can be cast in the framework of 
maximization of net benefits of the highway /railway. But such analysis while feasible 
could give different results and much would depend upon the basis and assumptions 
made, and these may not be good enough to lead to elimination of  a large number of 
possibilities especially at the micro-level.  Therefore it would be better for the 
government to accept the current practice with its assumptions, concepts of highway/ 
railway engineers ex-ante. But the practice has to specified as a code in the rules 
associated with the law, so that due process can be used to justify the identification of 
particular lands.  With such process safeguards eminent domain can be used even in the 
case of new alignment of roads /railways/ pipelines/ canals/ waterways/ electricity 
transmission networks etc. 
 
Public Purpose in the Urban Context 
In the urban situation, clearly,  specific lands required for establishment for intra city and 
intercity transport networks which have only limited leeway so that the ex-ante basis laid 
out by the departments charged with these responsibilities ought to be acceptable. Much 
the same is true of cable, gas, electricity, sewerage, water and other networks. Housing 
linked to the operation and maintenance of these assets is justified only for field 
employees. 
 
Industrial Estates and Market Places 
Governments would like to acquire land for industrial estates but typically many lands 
could have been considered for the purpose and hence specific land is not required. Much 
the same can be said for lands for institutions, housing, commercial development and for 
sale or allotment to favoured groups such as officers, academics and journalists. 
Therefore no public “public purpose” justifying eminent domain is involved here.  
 
On the other hand land for market development (municipal markets, vegetable markets, 
hawkers yards) in a area where there is no market can and should happen only in central 
places and as such specific land is required. Market expansion would obviously require 
specific lands. Similarly lands for gardens, parks, and parking (in areas of the city that 
were developed in the pre-mass automobile era would require specific land. Since every 
case of public purpose cannot be specified (ex ante), and yet the need to describe public 
purposes and delimit the same is large, it would be appropriate to provide a special 
window in the law for government to bring in a public purpose and eminent domain that 
is beyond the specified list.  And the government can announce the same, invite challenge 
and overcome the same in a court of law and then go ahead with the use of eminent 
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domain. On the other hand when the government chooses to acquire land under public 
purposes mentioned in the act it should be able to go ahead with the onus being on the 
challenger to prove that public purpose is not involved.  
 
Revealing Project Data 
In all cases the total social value being delivered would have to be justified in a social 
cost benefit analysis, where the deadweight cost of displacement and loss of existing 
assets /income (but not the additional transfer payments involved) is considered as a 
social cost. This would imply that government / developers share the social cost benefit 
analysis of investment projects for public purposes (i.e. when specific land is required and 
eminent domain is used) with the public
24. This would be consistent with the idea that the 
legislature alone should have the power to approve government budgets. [And if the idea 
of legislative sanction in its spirit has to be adhered to, even off budget transactions like 
contingent liabilities, and  land acquisition payments need to have legislative approval/ or 
be capped]. Such transparency imposed upon government would also be consistent with 
the “Right to Information” and with the advancement of democratic processes. 
 
Additional Windows for Eminent Domain 
The use of eminent domain and regulatory restraints (takings) would when left 
unconstrained result in  a perverse incentives on incumbent governments to use both 
restraints on land use and land acquisitions to lower the cost / increase the reported net 
benefits of projects and investment proposals that they choose to promote.  Governments 
face a trade off between taxation and payments for  land acquisition. But since taxes are 
voted and acquisitions (and contingent liabilities) are not,there is a perverse incentive to 
undervalue land or use regulatory restraint (takings) to lower land values, rather than 
taxes to support its expenditures and projects. This difference is most crucial and as much 
as in the case of contingent liabilities and guarantees there ought to be “caps on” the 
government using the power of eminent domain. Unlike in the case of contingent 
liabilities though,  a risk weighted cap is not possible in the case of land. But with fair and 
independent valuation enshrined in the law,  the perverse incentive to use eminent domain 
and regulatory takings  is reduced considerably. And if public purpose too is specified in 
the law then the abuse of public purpose is quite unlikely. In order to allow for public 
purpose acquisition which may not have been anticipated in the law we have already said 
that a special window (to be rarely used) need to be provided. Alternatively or 
additionally governments must have the option of taking a project (a large project of great 
importance) with its land acquisition proposals and compensation to the legislature for 
sanction. 
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24 The only possible exception to this rule would be when national security is involved, as when 
say on air-base or submarine harbour is being planned. 
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FRAMEWORK FOR NON-COMPUSLORY ACQUISITION 
 
In India today there is no framework for private acquisition of land. There have been 
some instances of private parties in a hurry not going through the LAA, even for projects 
of significance especially when the government of the day was not friendly to the group. 
Nevertheless the general trend has been that the pressures on the government of the day to 
acquire land for investment by private parties, even when no infrastructure is  involved, 
has been very high.  And few state governments including those that are pro-poor and 
pro-agriculturists can avoid offering land to attract investment. Acquiring land privately 
can become a nightmare for the party in question especially when large amount of land is 
required, and yet not result in significant benefits to those giving up land. The problem of 
jump up in value due to prior regulatory restraint (NAC requirement), and the 
enhancement of the hold out problem that it results in typically enhances the risk in 
private acquisition of good agricultural land.  
 
Worthy parties who are focused on investments and not on playing the regulatory 
arbitrage game are particularly vulnerable  Adverse selection cannot be ruled out in such 
cases. It goes without saying that the first and necessary step to overcome the problem  is 
to allow a well functioning land market to develop. That would mean removal of all 
unnecessary restraints and constraints on land use, sale and purchase already described  
earlier. To further ease the problem of hold-out, the  framework of  a register to declare 
intent to buy land privately along the lines mentioned below can greatly ease the burden 
of acquisition and ensure fair values to those having to part with their lands. Such 
registers should work to greatly reduce transactions cost if a specified threshold say  a 
80% land area and 75% owner’s agreement implies the agreement of all. Such a limit 
need be specified only when the fragmentation is very large and of the order of 30 or 
more units. Where lesser numbers are involved the hold out problem is not severe and the 
transactions cost not large, and deals  have a high probability of going through. Hold out 
is possible but the promoter has the option to go to other such areas at little cost since no 
specific land is required. Where specific land is required then in any case eminent domain 
would apply. Appropriate safeguards such as considering all pieces under a use being 
considered as belonging to a “single owner” for determination of threshold would have to 
be specified in the framework. This would reduce the probability of the hold out while 
leaving the sellers to come together to bargain to obtain for themselves some of the 
economies in aggregation and in the new land use. 
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ALTERNATIVES TO LAND ACQUISITION 
 
 
Much land currently acquired by the government especially municipal and town 
development authorities may be  quite unnecessary. Thus in contrast to practise in many 
cities, the “TP scheme” of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) is an 
easy way to planned growth of the city without acquisition of the entire planned area as 
such and vastly reduced transactions cost. Here acquisition is net rather than gross.  
 
“TP Schemes” 
The system works in the following manner. The AUDA identifies a certain large region 
say on the western outskirts of the city for further urban development. Imagine that the 
current use of the land is largely for agriculture and residences. In the master plan the 
same area is demarcated into roads, public parks and gardens, areas for other public 
utilities and water bodies etc and for possession by the AUDA itself. And the rest is 
available for private occupation subject to land use restrictions –floor space indices (FSI), 
zoning, and building bye-laws. The public land use plus that desired by the AUDA for 
future sale and use is restricted typically to about 30% of the land being brought in for 
planned urban development. This means that each plot is shrunk by 30% to make the 
space for 30% public land use and municipal ownership, leaving the owners with their 
current lands which are now smaller by 30%. In the layout most plots do have the same 
neighbours as before and substantial assets like houses generally do not have to be 
demolished.  The “TP scheme” is then put up for the public to bring their individual 
objections, and accepted in due course. All land owners gain since there is no land 
transfer - only net public land transfer to the  government. From the government’s point 
of view there is little risk and contest and the government does not have to pay for the 
land. The value creation is implicit in the act of town planning which if functional can 
create much value.  
 
Additionally, given the NAC requirement for use out of agriculture, the sudden high jump 
up in value often as much as ten times means that those whose lands are so incorporated 
into the urban area gain enormously since the regulatory arbitrage as explained before is 
large.  Even without the regulatory arbitrage the value increase on account of 
incorporation into the town with access to all urban services would make feasible such an 
approach. The regulatory arbitrage currently makes the AUDA approach unfair to those 
areas (and their owners) which could have been used for the extension of the city but is 
not as in the eastern periphery of the city. Without regulatory arbitrage the implicit 
transfer from those whose lands are  is not incorporated to those benefiting out of “TP 
schemes”  it is would be small and limited to the difference caused by the provision of 
infrastructure and to the value addition in (appropriate) zoning. ] If NAC is abolished and 
TP schemes are practiced, there is considerable scope for incorporation of land into urban 
areas without the many distortions and dilatory processes and litigation that takings and 
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“Implicit” Acquisition in Road Widening 
Similar approaches are possible elsewhere for instance in highway widening. Imagine that 
a highway with much ribbon development along its length is sought to be widened and 
made into an expressway with limited access to allow for fast movement between the two 
cities it connects. The government would face high risks and costs to takeover land and 
build the road, given that much ribbon development has already taken place. Typically in 
ribbon development the plots just adjacent to the highway would be high priced with the 
prices falling off steeply from the first to the interior plots. Often the third plot from the 
highway without access to a motorable road can have  a price as low as a third or less that 
of the plots on the road. This is because unplanned ribbon development in restricting the 
access of the interior plots to the road destroys social value, while steeply enhancing the 
price of the plots having access to the road. Would not the market have resulted in a shift 
from ribbon development to more broad based corridor development? The very high 
values of the plots adjoining the road results in much of the surplus in economic activity 
being drawn out in the form of rents. Thereby the economic potential of the road itself to 
bring about development of the area is considerably attenuated. Seemingly there would be 
significant returns to aggregators, i.e. those who can buy up simultaneously interior plots 
and small pieces of land on the road to provide access of the interior plots to the road.  
But such measures would require a thriving land market with low transactions cost. Only  
bigger players who can operate at a larger scale could normally carry on such activities. 
The practise of  land for land to provide access to the interior would not work since those 
giving up land on the road would be losers
25. Similarly since much ownership of land is 
bundled with the economic activity and to homesteads there would be systematic 
erroneous valuation of returns to the economic activity, generally tending to either 
overvalue or undervalue the same.  
 
In such a situation one option for the government (if there is sufficient potential for 
development in the area on either side of the road), is to develop an access (subsidiary 
road) along with the expressway so that fast access from any point in the corridor of the 
expressway to the center of both cities is possible. The lands for the expressway, such 
access roads and cross roads besides for other public amenities can be identified as 
constituting say 10%
26 of the land corridor and the same can be plotted out, to shrink all 
plots proportionately (or even disproportionately leaving their topological relationship 
broadly unaltered. This would certainly result in value appreciation (assuming that the 
access and subsidiary roads are built) without having to acquire the entire amount of land. 
Only compensation to cover the cost of buildings that would have to be razed to make 
way for the roads need be provided. Such an approach would also allow the government 
to avoid bundling commercial development merely to make a socially viable project 
financially viable. With this approach the project would be financially viable since the 
cost of the road would be limited to the construction cost while the otherwise very high 




  Page No. 21  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
                                                 
25 This is the “norm” in Kerala. As a result, ribbon development has only got enhanced and has 
choked the roads, and imposed impossible `land cost’ on the state attempting to widen roads. 
Typically the land for land principle  brings out perverse behaviour on the part of those on the 
road; they show a propensity to build around footpaths to the interior plots preventing motorised 
vehicle access possible by widening such footpaths. This perverse behaviour is entirely rational. 
26 When the cities in question  that the expressway connects are large, and growing rapidly, the 
corridor along the expressway where values are enhanced can be expected to be broader. 
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Use of TDRs 
We now consider another approach that can considerably lower transactions cost of 
obtaining land for public purposes that enhances social value. Thus in the very same 
situation of converting ribbon development to corridor development  an alternative 
possibility  is to lay out the land required for public purposes – the expressway, subsidiary 
service and feeder roads and other public amenities. To takeover the land required for 
these through eminent domain and award coupons embodying rights to development   
(transfer of development rights –TDRs for example) to such persons whose lands are so 
taken over. Builders and developers on lands elsewhere in the corridor who are free to 
develop in accordance with a plan perforce have to buy up these TDRs in a market in 
certain quantities that is related to the amount of construction or economic activity. This 
would ensure that those giving up lands are automatically rewarded
27. These can be at 
sufficiently large values to remove fears of value loss in giving up land, when the ratios 
are correctly determined. TDRs can also be used to offset value changes than occur on 
zoning,  and also to compensate for regulatory takings to preserve heritage and natural 
resources without being unfair to those whose lands are so restrained. TDRs were 
innovated only much after the economic transformation of Western Europe and 
America
28. But since much of the road construction, road-widening and more generally 
infrastructure construction lie ahead in countries such as India, there is much gain that can 




Rehabilitation issues have been compounded by the inherent unfairness of the acquisition  
process. Correction of the same along with the internalisation of  the cost of land, 
transactions and displacement into the project would go a long way towards better and 
risk reducing rehabilitation. Rehabilitation should never violate the principle of pareto-
optimality. This means that those currently displaced should be compensated to cover the 
value of land and their current incomes. But since partaking in growth is (or out to be a 
public good) their current incomes (rising at the planned or expected growth rates of the 
economy) needs to be protected.  When we also recognise that given  disguised 
unemployment alternative job opportunities cannot be assumed, So the onus would be on 
the project to ensure that incomes of all affected are protected at their expected dynamic 
levels.  
 
Rehabilitation /compensation as a one time measure would not be suitable in all cases.  
Use of TDRs is possible to transfer the benefits to catchment area farmers (from 
command area farmers),  who would otherwise lose through displacement, submergence, 
restraints on agriculture and more generally land use restrictions required to ensure low 
levels of siltation. Similarly land for land is also possible by using “land shrinkage” of 
 
  Page No. 22  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
                                                 
27 Land owners would of course insist on a floor for the TDRs, which would be close to the 
current market price of the land. Assuming that sufficient enhancement of value takes place in the 
proposed economic activity it should always be possible, to specify such a floor. Indeed 
specifying a floor acts as a check on government, creating fiscal pressures  and appropriate 
reputational stakes  to ensure that projects are selected designed and managed in a way that 
maximizes social values. Since LDCs are growing rapidly, the situation of planning when 
functional, not resulting in large value enhancement would be rare. 
28 TDRs arose in the West more to protect environmental and heritage resources, and to control 
the declining densities. In India, in a crude form they are beginning to be used in Mumbai for 
slum `clearance’ with some success (Kothari, B. (2002)).  
  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
now irrigated lands.  Thus if the area of submergence is say 10% of the area that is 
irrigated then a TP like method that allows for farm shrinkage by around 10%  of the 
command area would allow enough (now) irrigated land to be transferred to the displaced.  
Tribals and other marginalised people displaced in hydroelectric and irrigation projects 
could be vested with the residual rights to the assets potentialities created such as those 
related to fishing,  tourism. This would allow tribals and their cooperatives or 
corporations paying rents to tribal organisations their cooperatives and corporations to 
charge rents and provide these services. In many instances there is a case to err on the 
side of overcompensation since in not having protests and political mobilisation vast 
delays and cost overruns that damage the very social viability of projects can be avoided. 
There is much to be learned from the examples of good land acquisition and rehabilitation 
such as in  the case of NTPC’s Simhadri Project near Vizag. [Morris, S., and Ajay Pandey 
(2005)].   They all highlight the point that the economics and justice aspects of acquisition 
have to be sound. The fact that these acquisitions and rehabilitations had to go beyond the 
law as such is further evidence that the law is in need of major overhaul. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
 
Much of the risks and delays in land acquisition as also the protests that typically follow 
when substantial amounts of land are acquired arise out of the perversities inherent in the 
provisions of the LAA 1894 as amended in 1984.  
 
Besides high transactions taxes,  other measures not directly linked to the LAA but what 
we may club together under the term “regulatory restraints on land use” have significantly 
distorted  the land markets depressing greatly the price of land currently under agriculture 
but with the potential to be used for non-agricultural purposes. Most notable has been the 
requirement of Non-Agricultural (Use) clearance. 
 
Because the clearance is accorded typically post acquisition (post sale when no 
compulsory taking is involved) or along with the acquisition, the farmer/original land 
owner suffers much value denial, and creates vast rents to the acquirer or new owner post 
acquisition. 
 
Similarly since there is no provision for “commutation of objections to the title” outside 
the provisions of the LAA 1884,  there is considerable potential for “title arbitrage” to 
take place, i.e., for the post acquisition users to gain out of the now clear title. 
 
The LAA while using eminent domain for compulsory takings, does not set up a process 
for either examination of the “public purpose” or for independent valuation of the land 
proposed to be taken over. Since the modification of the LAA (1984) government can 
acquire land for companies, i.e. all activities can come under public purpose as long as the 
government of the day thinks so. These create fiscal distortions and large opportunities 
for rent seeking. 
 
The following changes in the LAA and in the framework of land acquisition 
/rehabilitation would be necessary to remove the major risks and perversities and ensure a 
fair process of land acquisition:  
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The public purpose can and should be specified in the law as arising when specific land is 
required. Thus sites for dams and harbours, mines, road and other network industries 
would be specific lands. Similarly in the urban areas those activities that are crucially 
dependent upon access to central places and are typically not-appropriable would merit 
inclusion under public purpose.  It is important to specify the public purpose ex-ante 
rather than leave acquisition acts open to challenge as is the case in the US. The option of 
not specifying the public purpose and not allowing challenge current in India is most 
undemocratic  and gives excessively discretionary powers to the government and is one 
of important reasons for protest against the state.  
 
Nevertheless options to take particular proposals (when outside the purpose specified ex-
ante) for land acquisition under eminent domain directly to the courts and or legislature 
need to be provided for to since not all public purposes can be seen in advance. 
 
In the use of eminent domain the valuation of the land should not be carried out by the 
government but by independent professional bodies, and differences between such 
agencies when larger than 20% or so should go to arbitrators /courts for resolution. 
 
All current restrictions on land use (other than those related to zoning of planning 
territories under urban development authorities) need to go. Most importantly the 
requirement of Non-Agricultural Use Clearance needs to go. Similarly the ban on the 
purchase of agricultural land for agricultural and other uses by non-agriculturalists, which 
is there in some states notably Gujarat and Maharashtra  needs to go.  
 
Transactions taxes cannot be at the punitive of 10 % and above that they currently are
29. 
They need to come down to less than 2% to allow smaller players also to use land as 
assets to buy and sell. If need be lower levels of government could be compensated for 
these tax losses. Similarly the tendency of mafias to be involved in land deals arises on 
account of the regulatory restrictions on land and the discretion available to the 
government to change these especially to award “NAC”, besides the large transaction 
taxes. 
 
The capitalised rental value of the land may  be an underestimate of value even when all 
current distortions are removed and the value may be closer to the capitalised value of the 
value added in land given that disguised unemployment and considerable poverty still 
exists in large parts of the country.  
 
Similarly in the valuation models, even in situations where the market is allowed to play 
its role, valuation of a specific piece of land in relation to another piece whose market 
price is available would have to recognise the value of natural resources especially water 
endowments that are accessible via the land and the intangible aspects of value such as 
nearness to central places and to transport networks. 
 
There are many ways to carry out road widening, town planning, value enhancing 
investments like converting ribbon development to corridor development, providing 
public service through implicit acquisition,  as in plot shrinking under “TP schemes” and 
in the use of “transfer of development rights” (TDRs). TDRs can also be used to make the 
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process of town planning and corridor development fair to all the beneficiaries including 
those who give up their lands.   
 
Rehabilitation issues have been compounded by the inherent unfairness of the acquisition  
process. Correction of the same along with internalising of the cost of land, and costs of 
transactions and displacement into the project would go a long way towards better and 
risk reducing rehabilitation.  
 
Rehabilitation needs to be pareto-optimal. Those currently displaced should be 
compensated to cover the value of land, and their current incomes rising at the planned 
growth rates of the economy need to be protected, through compensation. 
 
Independently of the LAA, measures to enhance the clarity with regard to title and to 
protect landed property would be important. A framework to allow any private owner of 
land to “commutate all objections to title” through due process would remove the scope 
for “title arbitrage” by the state and beneficiaries of state acquired lands. Similarly vastly 
better land records and registers, with their mortgage and other claims information, and 
their accessibility would go a long way to allow the markets to operate better and for an 




The authors are grateful to the support provided by the UK High Commission. The views 
and analyses here are entirely those of the authors as individuals. 
 
 
  Page No. 25  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 













































  Page No. 26  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 




Asif, M. (1999). Land Acquisition Act: Need for an Alternative Paradigm. Economic and 
Political Weekly, June 19, pp. 1564-1566. 
 
Basu, Kaushik (ed.) (2007). The Oxford Companion to Economics in India A-Z”, New 
Delhi, Oxford Univ. Press.  
 
Delhi-Janwadi-Adhikar-Manch (2002). The Assault on Workers in Land Use Policy and 
Practice in Delhi. in: Morris & Shekhar (eds.) (2002). 
 
Fernandes, W. (1998). Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1998: Rights of Project-
Affected People Ignored. Economic and Political Weekly, October 17-24, pp. 2703-2706. 
 
Echeverria, John D. (2005) , “Some Thoughts on Kelo and the Public Debate Over 




GOI (1985). The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Government of India. 
 
Kothari, B. (2002). Transfer of Development Rights: An Alternative to Conventional 
Land Acquisition. in: Morris & Shekhar (eds.) (2002). 
 
Machemer, P. L., J. Thomas, et al. (2000). Transferable Development Rights: A Policy 
Brief for the Michigan Legislature. Michigan State University. December 1, 2000. 
 
Morris S., and Rajiv Shekar (eds.) (2004), India Infrastructure Report – Governance 
Issues for Commercialisation”, 3inetwork, Oxford University Press. New Delhi 
 
Morris, S (2005), Sins of the highway programme’s first phase haunt future planning 
Why the hurry for six-laning, even while four-laning is underway? Financial Express,  
October 11, 2005, 
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_archive_full_story.php?content_id=105190
 
Morris, S. (2001), “Issues in Infrastructure Development Today: The Interlinkages” in 
Morris, S (ed.) (2001a) 
 
Morris, S. (2006). One-sided law on land acquisition, Financial Express, June 20, 
(http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=131092) 
 
Morris, S. (2007), “Infrastructure”, in Kaushik Basu (ed. ) (2007). 
 
Morris, S. (ed.) (2001a), "India Infrastructure Report 2001: Issues in Regulation and 
Industry Market Structure", Oxford University Press, New Delhi, New York and Oxford, 
2001, Chapter I Overview, and Chapter 2. Issues in Infrastructure Today. 
 
 
  Page No. 27  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
  
 
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Ng, I. (2002). "Compulsory purchase and compensation in Hong Kong: A study of the 
role of the Land Development Corporation in Urban Renewal." Property Management 
2(20): 167-182. 
 
PUCL (1989). Enquiry into the Forcible and Illegal Land Sales and Acquisition for 
Industrial Purpose at Sarekhurd Village in Alwar District. Jaipur, Rajasthan. People's 
Union for Civil Liberties. 
 
Rubin, H. J. (1988). "The Danada Farm: Land Acquisition, Planning and Politics in 
Suburbia." American Planning Association /The Journal of the American Planning 
Association 54(1): 79-90. 
 
Shanin(ed.), T. (1971). Peasants and Peasant Societies. Middlesex, England, Penguin 
Books. 
 
Sharma (1991). Land Grab, Bombay Style: Urban Development in Vasai-Virar 
Hinterland of Bombay. Economic and Political Weekly, February 23, pp. 413-417. 
 
Sherry, J. E. H. (1996). "Land Regulation and Property Rights." Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly 2(37): 16-17. 
 
Srinivas, L. (1991). Land and Politics in India: Working of Urban Land Ceiling Act, 
1976. Economic and Political Weekly, October 26, pp. 2482-2484. 
 
Stevens, J. B. (1996). "Speculations: John Locke, Environmental Property and Instream 
Water Rights." Land Economics 72(2): 261-68. 
 
Summers, Adam (2006), “Commentary Master of Your Domain: The Impact of the Kelo 
Decision.  Why property rights are so crucial to freedom”, Reason.org, 26th June 
(http://www.reason.org/commentaries/summers_20060626.shtml). 
 




  Page No. 28  W.P.  No.  2007-05-04 
 